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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last six years, forensic DNA analysis has become increas-
ingly important in criminal trials. In early cases, defense attorneys
were often overwhelmed by the technical aspects of DNA evidence.
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This situation was made much worse by the difficulty in finding expert
witnesses willing to testify for the defense. Although the latter prob-
lem has eased somewhat, it is still the rare defendant who can afford
to hire expert witnesses to testify about DNA analysis.
This Article is designed to assist those criminal defense attorneys
in the unenviable position of having to challenge DNA evidence in
court without the advice of a scientific expert to assist in discovery,
pre-trial motions, cross-examination, and trial strategy. It covers the
basic science involved in DNA analysis, the history of forensic DNA
evidence in criminal proceedings, and some of the strategies used in
successful challenges to the admissibility of DNA evidence. The final
section provides some sample questions that might be used in attack-
ing the weight of evidence during cross-examination.
II. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
DNA is the genetic material that functions as a blueprint for the
body. Whether someone will be short or tall, have blue or brown eyes,
or be of Hispanic or Asian appearance is determined by their DNA,
half of which is inherited from their father and half from their mother.
Almost every cell in the body contains the same content of DNA.' For
forensic purposes, this means that most tissue samples left at a crime
scene, such as blood, skin scrapings, hair follicles or semen, will con-
tain the perpetrator's DNA. Forensic scientists use DNA typing to de-
termine whether a given suspect's DNA does or does not match a DNA
sample left at a crime scene.
The structure of molecular DNA is a double helix. It resembles a
ladder that has been twisted around itself to form a spiral stairway.
The "rungs" of the ladder consist of pairs of chemicals called purine
and pyrimidine bases. There are only four types of bases found in
DNA. These are guanine (G), adenine (A), thymine (T), and cytosine
(C). Because of their shape, these bases form pairs, with a cytosine
always paired with a guanine and a thymine always paired with an
adenine. If we look at a single strand of DNA (corresponding to half of
a ladder that has been split lengthwise), it would consist of millions of
bases joined together in a row, which could be abbreviated something
like-AAGCTCAAGCTTACGTGCAAATCCCGCTACCATGGCC-and
so on. There are about three billion base pairs of DNA in the nucleus
of the human cell. These are organized into twenty-three pairs of
chromosomes. Each chromosome contains one double helical molecule
of DNA.
1. Most cells contain 23 pairs of chromosomes. Sperm cells only contain half as
much DNA per cell, but a sperm sample will contain all 23 pairs of chromosomes.
Mature red blood cells do not contain any DNA. However, a blood sample also
contains white blood cells, which contain normal amounts of DNA.
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It is generally agreed that if we could examine all three billion ba-
ses of DNA sequence, we would find that everyone's DNA is unique.2
In practice, it is not possible to do this. Typically, forensic scientists
only examine four or five limited regions of DNA containing a few tens
of thousands of base pairs out of the three billion. Each of these re-
gions represents a particular location on a specific chromosome. Indi-
vidually, each region is called a locus (the plural form is "loci"). In a
forensic DNA typing experiment, four or five different loci would be
compared between a suspect's DNA and a crime scene DNA sample to
see whether or not they match. If a match is observed, this indicates,
but does not prove, that the suspect could have left that DNA sample
at the crime scene, and therefore could have committed the crime. Al-
ternatively, if no match is observed, this rules out the suspect as the
source of that particular DNA sample.3
All people look very similar in many regards. We have two eyes,
two arms, two legs, and are all about the same size and shape. Cer-
tainly two humans look much more alike than a human and a fish.
This general similarity in appearance reflects a general similarity in
DNA content. Many DNA loci are almost identical in sequence be-
tween one human and another. These are referred to as monomorphic
loci. In contrast, some loci vary a great deal between one person and
another. These are called polymorphic loci. Not surprisingly, forensic
DNA typing uses polymorphic loci to compare DNA samples.
The commonly used polymorphic loci are known as variable
number of tandem repeat (or VNTR) sequences. A VNTR sequence
contains a short core sequence of about ten to thirty base pairs.
Within a given VNTR region, the core sequence will be present in mul-
tiple copies that are linked together end to end. For example, if a core
sequence were represented as ATTGGGC, then a VNTR sequence
might look like-ATTGGGCATTGGGCATTGGGC. In this simple
VNTR sequence, the core sequence is repeated three times. In actual
VNTR sequences, the core sequence can be repeated anywhere from a
few times to several hundred times. The length of the VNTR sequence
depends upon the size of the core sequence and number of times the
core sequence is repeated (the number of tandem repeats). In a typi-
cal DNA typing experiment, forensic scientists look at four or five dif-
ferent VNTR loci and measure the length of each one. Since VNTR
loci are highly polymorphic, the length of the VNTR sequence tends to
2. Except for identical twins, whose DNAs would be identical, all other individuals
should exhibit some differences in their total DNA sequence. E.g., State v.
Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Minn. 1989)(stating that "no two individuals,
except for identical twins, have identical DNA"); Co~MrrEE ON DNA TEcHNOL-
OGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNcIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN
FORENSIC SCIENCE 74 (1992)[hereinafter NRC REPORT].
3. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 75.
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vary from one individual to another. When the VNTR sequences from
a crime scene sample and a suspect's DNA are of the same apparent
length, this constitutes a "match."
III. FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF DNA SAMPLES
There are two basic techniques that forensic scientists use to char-
acterize VNTR loci. The one most commonly used is restriction frag-
ment length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis. An alternative
technique is polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification.4
Although PCR amplification has the advantage of requiring much less
DNA than RFLP does, it has disadvantages as well, including a
greater sensitivity to sample contamination.5 As currently applied, it
is also less useful at limiting the number of individuals who could
have left a crime scene DNA sample.6 The large majority of criminal
trials where DNA evidence has been introduced have involved RFLP
analysis. The balance of this Article will therefore focus upon the
RFLP technique.
There are six steps to an RFLP analysis.7 The first step is to purify
DNA from either a crime scene sample or the suspect's or victim's
blood sample. The sample is dissolved in a detergent with an enzyme
added to break up the cells.8 DNA is then separated from other mole-
4. In polymerase chain reaction amplification a small portion of a single chromo-
some is selected for amplification (copying). In forensic work, this targeted region
might contain a VNTR locus. To start PCR, two short sequences of synthetic
DNA are added to the DNA sample. These sequences are called "primers" be-
cause they bind to the chromosome on either side of the region to be copied. An
enzyme (DNA polymerase) is added that can attach to each primer and elongate
it, using the chromosomal DNA as a template for synthesis of a new DNA strand.
Because of this copying function, every cycle of the PCR process results in twice
as many copies of the targeted DNA sequence. After about thirty cycles of PCR
amplification, there are approximately one million copies of the amplified VNTR
locus. Because the primers are selected so that they only bind to a single locus,
only this locus is amplified. The size of the PCR product is determined by gel
electrophoresis, as described for the RFLP process. See infra note 14 and accom-
panying text. When the PCR products from the suspect's DNA and crime scene
sample are the same apparent size, this indicates a match at a single locus.
5. See NRC REPoRT, supra note 2, at 64-70.
6. Until recently, forensic DNA analysis by PR was limited to a single locus,
known as HLA-DQa. Id. at 68. As discussed in Part IV, the statistical signifi-
cance of a matching DNA proffle between suspect and crime scene sample de-
pends upon the number of loci tested. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying
text. A single locus test is not particularly informative because many individuals
may show the same PCR product when tested at only one locus. A match based
upon four or five loci is much more definitive in identifying a perpetrator. There
is no intrinsic reason why PCR analysis could not be applied to five or more loci.
7. E.g., Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 439 (Ga. 1990); State v. Schwartz, 447
N.W.2d 422, 425 (Minn. 1989).
8. Sodium dodecyl sulfate with Proteinase K is added to digest proteins that hold
the tissue together.
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cules by extraction with a mixture of organic solvents.9 This purified
DNA may contain a mixture of DNAs from more than one source. If
bacteria has contaminated the sample, the purified DNA will contain
both human and bacterial DNAs.1O If the crime scene sample contains
a mixture of blood or semen from different individuals, that same mix-
ture will be present in the purified DNA."
In the second step, the purified DNA is cut into small pieces, being
reduced in size from millions of basepairs to hundreds or thousands of
basepairs long. An enzyme called a restriction endonuclease is used to
reproducibly cut the DNA at specific DNA sequences.12 For example,
the FBI uses the restriction enzyme Hae III (which only cuts DNA at
the sequence GGCC).13 The restriction enzyme cuts the DNA on both
sides of the VNTR sequences being examined but does not cut the
VNTR sequence in the middle.
In the third step, the DNA fragments are separated by size using
gel electrophoresis.14 A liquified gel is poured into a tray and solidi-
fies. The cut up DNA is placed into small wells near one end of the
gel. Because DNA molecules are negatively charged, they migrate
when placed in an external electrical field. Such a field is applied to
the DNA gel, and the DNA fragments move towards the positive pole
at the bottom of the gel. The shortest fragments move the fastest, so
the DNA fragments end up sorted by size along the gel, with the
smallest pieces at the bottom.
In the fourth step, the gel containing the DNA fragments is re-
moved from the electrical field. A nylon membrane is placed against
the gel and another field is applied so that the DNA moves out of the
gel onto the membrane, retaining the same order of fragments from
top to bottom.15
In the fifth step, the nylon membrane is soaked in a solution con-
taining a probe molecule.16 A probe molecule will bind to specific
DNA sequences on the membrane.17 Every VNTR sequence tested
9. Frequently this is a mixture of phenol, chloroform and isoamyl alcohol in a ratio
of 25:24:1. This separates proteins and lipids from the DNA and RNA in the
sample.
10. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 993 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
11. See NRC REPoRT, supra note 2, at 66.
12. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 990-91 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
13. Shui Tse Chow et al., The Development of DNA Profiling Database in an HAE III
Based RFLP System for Chinese, Malays and Indians in Singapore, 38 J. FoREN-
sic Sci. 874, 874 (1993).
14. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 991 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
15. Id. at 991.
16. A typical probe molecule consists of a short segment of DNA (called an oligonucle-
otide) that is either chemically synthesized or else enzymatically produced in a
test tube. The sequence of the oligonucleotide is controlled so that it will only
bind to the VNTR sequence at the locus being tested.
17. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 991-92 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
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will bind to a different probe molecule. The probes have been labelled,
usually by making them radioactive.8 Excess probe is washed away,
and the radioactively labelled membrane is dried.
Finally, the labelled membrane is exposed to X-ray film in a pro-
cess called autoradiography. In places where the membrane is radio-
actively labelled, a band appears on the X-ray film.' 9 The bands
correspond to the locations on the gel where specific VNTR sequences
migrated.
A typical DNA typing result is shown in Figure 1. It is expected
that every individual's DNA will contain one or two bands for each
DNA locus tested. Two copies of each VNTR locus are inherited, one
from the mother and one from the father. If the two parental copies
are similar in size, only one band will be apparent on the X-ray film
(Fig. 1, lane 3). Otherwise two bands of different size should appear
(Fig. 1, lanes 1, 2, 4 and 5).
FIGURE 1. RFLP ANALYSIS OF DNA AT A SINGLE LOCUS
MW 1 2 3 4 5 MW
A typical gel will contain molecular weight DNA standards (MW), a crime scene DNA
sample (lane 1), the victim's DNA (lane 2) and one or more suspect DNA samples
(lanes 3 through 5). There is an apparent match at this locus between one of the
suspect DNA samples (lane 5) and the crime scene sample (lane 1). Gels may contain
up to 25 lanes. Additional controls might include a sample of known DNA profile.
A DNA typing experiment will compare three types of DNA, one
from the victim, one or more crime scene samples, and a like number
of suspect DNA samples. A certain number of control DNAs should
also be run.20 In Figure 1, it is apparent that the crime scene sample
18. Radioactive isotopes of phosphorus [32P] or sulfur [35S] are incorporated into the
probe molecule. Recently, chemical labelling techniques have been used in some
laboratories in place of radioactive labelling.
19. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 992 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
20. All RFLP gels should include controls for molecular weight markers. These are
DNA fragments of known size (molecular weight). The apparent molecular
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(Fig. 1, lane 1) does not match the victim's DNA (Fig. 1, lane 2), but it
does match one suspect's DNA profile at this particular locus (Fig. 1,
lane 5). Results with other loci may confirm or disprove the match.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
DNA PROFILE
A match between suspect DNA and crime scene sample DNA at a
single locus is determined when the DNA fragments generated by
RFLP or PCR analysis are of the same apparent size (that is, they
move the same distance down the gel, as in Fig. 1 lanes 1 and 5). In
DNA analysis, two samples of DNA taken from the same individual,
digested with the same restriction endonuclease and run in two adja-
cent lanes on a gel, will not necessarily move exactly the same dis-
tance.21 There may be minor defects in the way the gel is formed,
contaminants like salt or proteins may be present in different sam-
ples, or there may be differences in the amount of DNA loaded in each
lane. These can cause identical DNA bands to migrate differently.
22
Therefore, when forensic laboratories perform a DNA analysis, they
do not require that two DNA samples move exactly the same distance
down the gel in order to declare a match.
Usually, each forensic laboratory establishes a "match criterion7 or
"match window."23 This is basically a "fudge factor" that allows the
lab to declare a match even when the bands on the autoradiograph do
not exactly line up. The FBI uses a match criterion of plus or minus
two and a half percent.24 This means that if the estimated sizes of the
alleles in the suspect's DNA are within two and a half percent of the
estimated sizes of the corresponding alleles in the crime scene DNA,
they are considered to match. For the forensic laboratory to declare
that the suspect's DNA profile matches that of the crime scene sample,
the alleles must fall within the match criterion for each of the loci
weight of each sample DNA fragment (including those of victim, suspect, and
crime scene) will be calculated by comparison with the DNA fragments of known
size. In addition, the NRC Report recommended that RFLP controls include run-
ning a known DNA sample on each gel (to ensure that the procedure is working)
and using monomorphic probes to detect band shifting. NRC REPORT, supra note
2, at 57-60.
21. E.g., Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 442 (Ga. 1990).
22. See NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 60. See also United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D.
161, 208 (N.D. Ohio 1990)(stating that the use of ethidium bromide in analytic
gels can be a contributing factor), aff'd, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993); Caldwell v.
State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 442 (Ga. 1990)(describing this phenomenon as band shift-
ing and stating that as a result "[t]he banding patterns of two different samples
containing the same DNA may not line up exactly").
23. A match criterion is "an objective and quantitative rule for deciding whether two
samples match." NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 54.
24. People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 736 (Ct. App. 1992); Springfield v. State,
860 P.2d 435, 442 (Wyo. 1993).
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tested. If the suspect's DNA matches the crime scene DNA for four
out of five loci, but differs at the fifth locus, a match should not be
declared. If the crime scene and suspect DNAs match at all of the loci
tested, the two DNA profiles are declared to match.
The issue on which DNA evidence is most frequently ruled inad-
missible concerns the next step of the process, the determination of
the statistical significance of the matching profiles.25 This is usually
expressed as the random chance of finding another individual with the
same DNA profile within the population of all possible suspects. In
practice, once a suspect has been identified through other evidence,
DNA frequencies are usually determined within the subpopulation of
the suspect's own ethnic group. For example, an Hispanic suspect's
DNA profile frequency would be determined with reference to the His-
panic database, while a Caucasian suspect's DNA profile frequency
would be determined from the Caucasian database. The ethnic com-
position of all possible suspects is generally unknown. If some com-
promise must be made in selecting a database, perhaps using the
ethnicity of the suspect is the most reasonable one.
Once an appropriate database is selected, calculation of random
match frequency is straightforward. For each locus tested, the sus-
pect's DNA should show either one or two alleles (one or two bands on
an autoradiograph). With highly polymorphic loci, it is usually not
25. See, e.g., State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1190 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1578 (1994); People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725-26 (Ct. App. 1993); Peo-
ple v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 745 (Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Lani-
gan, 596 N.E.2d 311, 314-17 (Mass. 1992); Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d
440, 442-43 (Mass. 1991); Commonwealth v. Vega, 634 N.E.2d 149, 152 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1994); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502,515 (Wash. 1993). See also State
v. Sivri, 646 A.2d 169, 192 (Conn. 1994)(discussing the disagreement among
courts, as well as within the scientific community, as to the general acceptance of
population frequency calculations); United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 631
(D.C. 1992)(stating that a scientific consensus as to the precise probability offered
was not required; instead, the prosecution must only show that there is consen-
sus that the probability of finding the particular match was no greater than some
very small fraction); Vargas v. State, 640 So. 2d 1139, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994)(stating that questions of scientific acceptance of population frequency sta-
tistics are properly viewed as affecting the admissibility of the statistical evi-
dence); People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 644 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)(upholding a
lower court decision finding that the lack of acceptance of the FBI methodology in
computing probability assessment not only required that the reported probability
be inadmissible, but also required that any evidence that a match had been dis-
covered was also inadmissible); State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 49-51 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993)(upholding the lower court's finding of inadmissibility under the FBI
methodology but allowing statistical results calculated under the NRC's modified
ceiling principal); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483,493-94 (N.H. 1992)(stating
that, in light of the finding of the NRC that considerable debate existed within
the scientific community regarding the existence and effect of population sub-
groups, the FBI's method of calculating population frequencies has not found gen-
eral scientific acceptance and the resulting calculations are inadmissible).
1995]
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possible to identify individual alleles because there are too many of
them and they do not all separate on gel electrophoresis. To resolve
this problem, the FBI uses "fixed bins" to identify groups of alleles. A
"bin" would consist of all alleles falling in between two adjacent DNA
markers (two DNA fragments of known size). The frequency of any
allele in this "bin" would be defined as the frequency of all alleles in
the bin.26 Any allele identified will fall within one of the "fixed bins"
and will be assigned a frequency based upon that bin.
The genotype frequency for each locus is defined as two times the
product of the individual allele frequencies. For example, suppose a
locus shows two alleles, with defined bin frequencies of "Fl" and "F2."
The genotype frequency for this locus is defined as "Gi = 2 x F1 x F2."
If the suspect's DNA only shows one allele at a locus (with a frequency
of "Fl"), the genotype frequency is defined as "G1 = 2 x Fl."27 For
each locus, a corresponding genotype frequency is calculated. To de-
termine the random match probability, all of these genotype frequen-
cies are multiplied together (product rule). For a five locus analysis,
the DNA frequency would be equal to the product of "G1 x G2 x G3 x
G4 x G5." Since each of the individial genotype frequencies will al-
ways be much smaller than one, the final value of a random match
probability will be a very small number. This type of calculation has
resulted in estimates of random match probability as low as one in 234
billion.28
This method of calculating random match probabilities has been
strongly criticized. 29 There are two basic assumptions involved in this
calculation that may not be valid. The first assumption, of Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium, is that all the alleles at a single locus are ran-
domly assorted within the population. This allows the calculation of
the genotype frequency "Gi" as the product of the individual allele
frequencies "2 x F1 x F2." The second assumption, of linkage equilib-
rium, is that all of the genotypes at each locus are randomly assorted
26. For example, if a bin contained three actual alleles, with frequencies of 1%, 1.5%
and 2.5%, the total bin frequency would be 5% and all alleles falling within this
bin would have an assigned statistical frequency of 5%.
27. According to standard genetic analysis, the genotype frequency for a homozygote
with a single allele at a locus should be calculated as "F1 x Fl", a much smaller
number than "2 x Fl." However, because gel electrophoresis is not capable of
separating all possible alleles, the more conservative (larger) estimate is used.
NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 78.
28. See Martinez v. State, 549 So. 2d 694, 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
29. See State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1187-89 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1578 (1994); State v. Anderson, 881 P.2d 29, 38-40 (N.M. 1994); State v.
Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 512-17 (Wash. 1993); NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-
15; Dan E. Krane et al., Genetic Differences at Four DNA Typing Loci in Finnish,
Italian and Mixed Caucasian Populations, 89 PRoc. NAT'L AcAD. ScI. U.S-.A
10583, 10583-84 (1992); R. C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in
Forensic DNA Typing, 254 SCIENCE 1745, 1745-47 (1991).
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within the population. This allows the calculation of the total random
match probability as the product of "GI x G2 x G3 x G4 x G5" (for a
five locus match). Both of these assumptions would be invalid if there
is any significant degree of population substructuring.30 In that case,
it would not be possible to accurately estimate the random match
probability by merely multiplying all allele and genotype frequencies
together.
Population substructuring exists when the alleles and genotypes
are not randomly distributed within the population. It is obvious that
some genetic traits are not randomly assorted. For example, consider
a "suspect" of Greek or Italian ethnicity. If one DNA locus specified
dark hair, another specified brown eyes, and a third specified olive
skin, we would not expect these traits to be randomly distributed in a
Greek or Italian database, compared to a database of all Caucasians
in general.31 Similarly, one would expect blue eyes, blond hair and
fair skin to be linked (that is, not randomly distributed) in a subpopu-
lation of Icelandic origin compared to the general Caucasian database.
So a linkage of genetic traits determined by DNA inheritance would be
expected to result in differences in subpopulation frequencies at some
loci. The key question is whether significant differences in subpopula-
tion frequencies occur in the polymorphic loci used in forensic DNA
analysis.32 Although arguments have been made on both sides, it is
30. See NRC REPoRT, supra note 2, at 76-79.
31. The author does not propose that all of these traits are regulated by single loci.
However, for simplicity, more easily understood examples have been used in this
discussion.
32. Although few scientific studies on this subject have been published, the results
indicate that some differences in allele frequencies do occur in different subpopu-
lations. This is often referred to as "population substructure." A study published
in the Journal of the National Academy of Sciences reported that allele frequen-
cies of some VNTR loci differ by nearly 4-fold between Finnish and Italian sub-
populations living in the St. Louis area. Krane et al., supra note 29, at 10585-86.
Although Chow et al. reported an absence of population substructure among Chi-
nese, Malays and Indians living in Singapore, it is important to note that they
came to this conclusion by arbitrarily defining the minimum frequency for any
allele as 0.01 (or 1%). Chow et al., supra note 13, at 879. Without using a mini-
mum 1% allele frequency, differences in allele frequencies as high as 11-fold can
be seen in different subpopulations (i.e. locus D10S28, bin #3 between Indians
and Malaysians). Id. at 876. It is interesting that this is basically the same ap-
proach as advocated in the NRC report's ceiling principle, where a minimum al-
lele frequency of 5% is proposed. NRC REPoRT, supra note 2, at 13. Because the
effects of population substructure on allele frequencies would be greatest for the
least frequent alleles, setting a minimum value for allele frequencies would tend
to eliminate any possible bias against the suspect resulting from population sub-
structure. Other reports using statistical analysis of databases have failed to
provide evidence of significant population substructure. E.g., B. Devlin & Neil
Risch, Ethnic Differentiation at VNTR Loci, with Special Reference to Forensic
Applications, 51 Am. J. Humx. GENmTIcs 534 (1992). However, these tests have
been criticized for their low statistical power to detect population substructure
1995]
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fair to say that there is a significant difference of opinion on this issue
between prominent members of the scientific community. 33
V. ADMISSIBILITY VS. WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE
Two tests are currently used to determine the admissibility of DNA
evidence. These are the general acceptance test of Frye3 4 and the rele-
vancy test of Daubert.35 The Frye test, based on a decision of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in 1923, was the prevailing view in federal
and state courts for over 60 years. Under Frye, scientific evidence
could only be admitted if it was generally accepted in the pertinent
scientific community. 36 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,37 the United States Supreme Court held that the relevancy test
set forth in Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702 superseded the stan-
dard established in Frye.3 8 In determining the admissibility of expert
testimony based upon novel scientific evidence, the Daubert Court
suggested four factors for consideration: 1) whether the theory or
technique in question can be (and has been) tested; 2) whether it has
been subjected to peer review and publication; 3) its known or poten-
tial error rate and the existence and maintenance of standards con-
trolling its operation; and 4) whether it has attracted widespread
acceptance within a relevant scientific community.3 9 Thus, under
Daubert the "general acceptance" standard of Frye is merely one of
even if it is present. See Eric S. Lander, Research on DNA Typing Catching Up
with Courtroom Application, 48 Am. J. Humr. GENETcs 819, 821 (1991); NRC IR-
PORT, supra note 2, at 81-82.
33. See Peter Aldhous, Geneticists Attack NRC Report as Scientifically Flawed, 259
SCIENCE 755, 755 (1993); Krane et al., supra note 29, at 10583-84; Eric S. Lander,
DNA Fingerprinting: the NRC Report, 260 SCIENCE 1221, 1221 (1993); Lander,
supra note 32, at 821; B. S. Weir, Population Genetics in the Forensic DNA De-
bate, Poc. NAT'L AcA . ScL U.S.A. 11654, 11654-58 (1992). For the view that
significant differences do occur see Lewontin & Hart, supra note 29, at 1745-47.
For the view that significant differences do not occur see B. Budowle et al., Fixed-
Bin Analysis for Statistical Evaluation of Continuous Distributions of Allelic
Data from VNTR Loci, for Use in Forensic Comparisons, 48 Am. J. Hum. GENET-
ICS 841, 851 (1991); Ranjit Chakraborty & Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA
Typing in Forensic Work, 254 SCIENCE 1735, 1736 (1991); Chow et al., supra note
13, at 883; Devlin & Risch, supra note 32, at 545; B. Devlin & Neil Risch, A Note
on Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium of VNTR Data by Using the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's Fixed-Bin Method, 51 Am. J. Hum. GENErCs 549,552 (1992); B. S.
Weir, Independence of VNTR Alleles Defined as Fixed Bins, 130 GENE-ICs 873,
873 (1992).
34. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
35. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
36. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
37. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
38. Id. at 2793.
39. Id. at 2796-97. However, it emphasized a flexible approach rather than a rigid
adherence to these factors alone. See id. at 2797.
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several factors to consider in determining the admissibility of DNA
evidence. 40
Although the Daubert decision did not by its terms apply to state
court proceedings,41 many states have evidentiary rules similar or
identical to Rule 702.42 This has turned out to be a significant devel-
opment for cases involving DNA evidence. The author has been un-
able to find a single case in which DNA typing evidence was found to
be inadmissible (as opposed to restricted) under the more relaxed
Daubert standard.43 In contrast, at least seventeen cases in federal or
state courts have found DNA evidence to be admissible under a rele-
vancy standard."
The Supreme Courts of Alaska, Colorado, Florida, New York and
Washington have held that the Frye standard is still to be used to
determine the admissibility of novel scientific evidence (including
DNA typing) in their jurisdictions. 45 A number of states, including
Delaware, Indiana, New Mexico, Oregon, and Wyoming, have applied
a relevancy standard like Daubert to the admissibility of DNA evi-
40. Id.
41. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide the standard for admitting expert scien-
tific testimony in federal trials. Id. at 2791.
42. See State v. Anderson, 881 P.2d 29, 40 (N.M. 1994).
43. However, two states have imposed limitations on the admissibility of DNA evi-
dence in criminal trials under a relevancy standard. In Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d
69, 76 (Del. 1993), the Supreme Court of Delaware held that evidence of matching
DNA proffles is not admissible unless evidence concerning the statistical signifi-
cance of the match is also admitted. In Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 444
(Ga. 1990), the Georgia Supreme Court held that DNA evidence obtained by
Lifecode's methods was admissible so long as a conservative estimate for statisti-
cal significance was used. The general subject of DNA evidence under Daubert
has recently been reviewed. See Barry C. Scheck, DNA and Daubert, 15 CARnozo
L. REv. 1959 (1994).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191 (8th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 734 (1994); United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d
786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); Government of Virgin Islands v.
Penn, 838 F. Supp. 1054 (D.V.I. 1993); Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Montalbo, 828 P.2d 1274 (Haw. 1992); Harrison v.
State, 644 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. 1995); State v. Brown, 470 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1991);
State v. Futrell, 436 S.E.2d 884 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Anderson, 881 P.2d
29 (N.M. 1994); State v. Pierce, 597 N.E.2d 107 (Ohio 1992); State v. Futch, 860
P.2d 264 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775 (Va. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1036 (1990); State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989); Springfield v.
State, 860 P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1993).
45. See Mattox v. State, 875 P.2d 763, 764 (Alaska 1994); Fishback v. People, 851
P.2d 884, 890-91 (Colo. 1993); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828-29 (Fla.
1993); People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454, 461 (N.Y. 1994); State v. Cauthron,
846 P.2d 502, 504-05 (Wash. 1993).
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dence in their courts.46 Several states, including Arizona, Illinois,
Minnesota and Pennsylvania, have continued to use the Frye test be-
cause their supreme courts have not yet ruled upon whether the
Daubert standard has superseded Frye in their jurisdictions.47
In determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, the
court in Frye held:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex-
perimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the de-
duction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
4 8
The arguments concerning admissibility of DNA evidence under
the Frye test have turned upon whether it is generally accepted within
the relevant scientific community. Although prosecution witnesses
have argued that the "relevant scientific community" should consist
solely of forensic scientists, it is generally held that a wider commu-
nity including molecular biologists and population geneticists should
be considered.49 The definition of "general acceptance" has varied by
jurisdiction. General acceptance does not require universal agree-
ment.50 In some jurisdictions this standard has been interpreted as
requiring acceptance by a clear majority of scientists.51 In others, the
existence of disagreement among scientists, significant in both
number and expertise, has resulted in the inadmissibility of DNA evi-
dence under Frye.52
People v. Castro53 was one of the earliest cases in which DNA evi-
dence was found to be inadmissible under Frye. The court in Castro
established a three pronged test for the admissibility of DNA typing
46. See Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 74 (Del. 1993); Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d
1243, 1251 (Ind. 1995); State v. Anderson, 881 P.2d 29, 30-31 (N.M. 1994); State
v. Futch, 860 P.2d 264,268 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435,
442 (Wyo. 1993).
47. See State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1183 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1578
(1994); People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 640-41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); State v. Alt,
504 N.W.2d 38,46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Commonwealth v. Crews, 640 A.2d 395,
400 n.2 (Pa. 1994).
48. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
49. People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 641-42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); United States v.
Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 634-35 (D.C. 1992).
50. United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 197 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff'd, 12 F.3d 540
(6th Cir. 1993); People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454 (N.Y. 1994).
51. See Vargas v. State, 640 So. 2d 1139, 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
52. See People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725-26 (Ct. App. 1993); People v.
Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 743 (Ct. App. 1992); United States v. Porter, 618
A.2d 629, 634 (D.C. 1992); People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 646 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994).
53. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
[Vol. 74:444
DNA IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE
evidence. It held that such evidence is admissible when: 1) there is a
generally accepted theory which supports the conclusion that forensic
DNA testing can produce reliable results; 2) it is generally accepted
that the techniques and methods used are capable of producing relia-
ble results; and 3) the testing laboratory actually performed the ac-
cepted scientific techniques in the particular case.54 The court found
that although prongs 1 and 2 were satisfied, the state had failed to
show that the testing laboratory applied the accepted techniques in
producing the DNA evidence.55 In fact, expert witnesses for both
prosecution and defense agreed that there were serious deficiencies in
the actual techniques utilized by the Lifecodes Corporation in this
particular case.56
The majority of courts applying Frye have held that the third prong
of Castro, concerning the actual techniques used in the particular
case, addresses the weight of the DNA evidence rather than its admis-
sibility.57 The first prong of Frye, the general acceptance of the scien-
tific theory behind DNA typing, is universally conceded to be
satisfied.58 Therefore, attacks upon the admissibility of DNA evidence
under Frye must generally be addressed to the second prong of Castro,
whether the techniques and methods used in the analysis are gener-
ally accepted within the scientific community. Recently, defense at-
torneys in Frye jurisdictions have been very successful in having DNA
evidence ruled inadmissible at the state supreme court or state appel-
late court level.59 In the large majority of these cases, exclusion of
54. Id. at 987.
55. Id. at 996-98.
56. See id. at 997.
57. See Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 893 (Colo. 1993); State v. Sivri, 646 A.2d
169, 189 n.32 (Conm. 1994); People v. Mehlberg, 618 N.E.2d 1168, 1195 (M11. App.
Ct.), appeal denied, 624 N.E.2d 813 (Ill. 1993); People v. Moore, 604 N.Y.S.2d 976,
977 (App. Div. 1993); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 506-07 (Wash. 1993). But
see People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 745-47 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985,
987-88 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
58. See, e.g., Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 892 (Colo. 1993); Caldwell v. State,
393 S.E.2d 436, 441 (Ga. 1990); People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 642-43 (Mll.
App. Ct. 1994); Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 441 (Mass. 1991);
State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989); State v. Anderson, 881
P.2d 29, 45 (N.M. 1994); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 988 (Sup. Ct. 1989);
State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 503, 510-11 (Wash. 1993).
59. See, e.g., State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1190 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1578 (1994); People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725-26 (Ct. App. 1993); Peo-
ple v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 745 (Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Lani-
gan, 596 N.E.2d 311, 314-17 (Mass. 1992); Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d
440, 445 (Mass. 1991); Commonwealth v. Vega, 634 N.E.2d 149, 151-52 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1994); State v. Schwartz, 477 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989); State v.
Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 503 (Wash. 1993). See also State v. Sivri, 646 A.2d 169,
190-92 (Conn. 1994)(disputing validity of population frequency calculations);
United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 631 (D.C. 1992)(determining that there is
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DNA evidence has been based upon the way in which forensic labora-
tories calculate the statistical probability of randomly matching the
DNA proffle of the crime scene sample.60 This subject is addressed in
detail in the following Part of this Article.
In jurisdictions using a relevancy standard like Daubert, it is un-
likely that DNA evidence will be ruled inadmissible. Under Daubert,
expert testimony on DNA evidence is admissible if it "both rests on a
reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand."61 This stan-
dard requires that the testimony pertain to scientific knowledge
grounded in science's methods and procedures, and be based on more
than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.6 2 This is designed
to rule out testimony based upon areas such as astrology or numerol-
ogy and to prohibit testimony which is based merely upon subjective
opinion that is not supported by experimental data. The relevancy
standard requires that the testimony assist the trier of fact in under-
standing the evidence or determining a fact in issue.63 However, DNA
evidence would be excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice to the defendant or the risk of confusing the
issues or misleading the jury.64
no consensus within the relevant scientific community in support of FBI's proce-
dures for determining a match); Vargas v. State, 640 So. 2d 1139, 1150 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994)(holding that method for arriving at population frequencies using
FBI database is not generally accepted); People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 646-
48 (M11. App. Ct. 1994)(determining that FBI's "fixed bin" methodology is not gen-
erally accepted and without a more conservative approach cannot be admitted);
State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 494 (N.H. 1992)(determining that statistical
technique FBI uses to estimate population frequencies is not generally accepted).
60. See, e.g., State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1188-90 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1578 (1994); People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725-26 (Ct. App. 1993);
People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 745 (Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311, 314-17 (Mass. 1992); Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565
N.E.2d 440, 445 (Mass. 1991); Commonwealth v. Vega, 634 N.E.2d 149, 152
(Mass. App. Ct. 1994); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 512-17 (Wash. 1993). See
also State v. Sivri, 646 A.2d 169, 190-92 (Conn. 1994)(disputing validity of popu-
lation frequency calculations); United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 631 (D.C.
1992)(determining that there is no consensus within the relevant scientific com-
munity in support of FBI's procedures for determining a match); Vargas v. State,
640 So. 2d 1139, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)(holding that method for arriving
at population frequencies using FBI database is not generally accepted); People v.
Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 646-48 (111. App. Ct. 1994)(determining that FBI's "fixed
bin" methodology is not generally accepted and without a more conservative ap-
proach cannot be admitted); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 494 (N.H.
1992)(determining that statistical technique FBI uses to estimate population fre-
quencies is not generally accepted).
61. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2790 (1993).
62. Id. at 2795.
63. Id. at 2790.
64. Id. at 2798
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In most cases tried under a relevancy standard, defense objections
to the techniques and methods used in forensic DNA analysis have
been held to address the weight of evidence, rather than admissibil-
ity.65 There have been at least two exceptions to this rule. In Nelson
v. State,66 the Supreme Court of Delaware held that evidence of
matching DNA profiles is not admissible unless evidence concerning
the statistical interpretation of the match is also admitted.67 Since
the trial court in this case excluded the statistical evidence, the evi-
dence concerning a match between the DNA profiles of suspect and
crime scene sample should also have been excluded.68 In Caldwell v.
State,69 the Georgia Supreme Court held that the statistical analysis
submitted by Lifecode's expert witness was based upon an unproven
assumption that the population was in Hardy-Weinberg equilib-
rium.70 However, the court allowed the introduction of a more con-
servative calculation of statistical significance that did not require the
assumption of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium.71 Under either of these
decisions, DNA evidence is admissible in state court criminal trials so
long as it complies with certain restrictions.
VI. CHALLENGING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA EVIDENCE
UNDER FRYE
In a number of recent cases, defense attorneys have successfully
challenged the admissibility of DNA evidence under the Frye standard
of general scientific acceptance.72 They have argued that the statisti-
cal calculations used to determine the probability of finding a match-
ing DNA profile in the population are not generally accepted within
the relevant scientific community.7 3 This argument was strengthened
65. See, e.g., United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 1994).
66. 628 A-2d 69 (Del. 1993).
67. Id. at 75.
68. Id. at 76.
69. 393 S.E.2d 436 (Ga. 1990).
70. Id. at 443-44.
71. Id. at 444.
72. See, e.g., State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1188-90 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1578 (1994); People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725-26 (Ct. App. 1993);
People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 745 (Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 445 (Mass. 1991); Commonwealth v. Vega, 634 N.E.2d
149, 152 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 503 (Wash.
1993). See also Vargas v. State, 640 So. 2d 1139, 1147-50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994)(holding that method for arriving at population frequencies using FBI
database is not generally accepted); People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 644-48
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994)(determining that FBrs "fixed bin" methodology is not gener-
ally accepted and without a more conservative approach cannot be admitted).
73. See, e.g., State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1188-90 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1578 (1994); People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725-26 (Ct. App. 1993);
People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 745 (Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 445 (Mass. 1991); Commonwealth v. Vega, 634 N.E.2d
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by a 1992 report from the National Research Council ("NRC
report").74
Although the NRC report validated the use of RFLP analysis and
DNA typing in general, it cast into doubt the assumptions of Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium and linkage equilibrium that are necessary in
order to use a product rule approach to probability calculations.75 The
NRC report questioned whether these assumptions were valid given
the possibility of population substructuring.76 It recommended that
until these questions are resolved, a more conservative statistical
analysis using a "ceiling approach" should be used.77
The issue of population substructuring has been central to the de-
bate over whether the statistical analysis used by the FBI and private
forensic laboratories is generally accepted within the scientific com-
munity. Basically, the question concerns whether allele frequencies
are similar in different subpopulations of the same ethnic group or
whether population substructuring is present.T8 Prosecution expert
witnesses have argued that population substructuring does not occur
149,.152 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 503 (Wash.
1993). See also Vargas v. State, 640 So. 2d 1139, 1147-50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994)(holding that method for arriving at population frequencies using FBI
database is not generally accepted); People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 644-648
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994)(determining that FBI's "fixed bin" methodology is not gener-
ally accepted and without a more conservative approach cannot be admitted).
74. NRC REPORT, supra note 2.
75. Id. at 76-80.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 82-85. Basically, the ceiling approach sets a lower limit on the estimated
frequency of any allele. This lower limit would be either 5% or the highest ob-
served frequency of that particular allele in any subpopulation. For example, if
an allele was present at a 1% frequency in Chinese, 3% frequency in Koreans,
and 10% frequency in Vietnamese, then the allele frequency used in statistical
calculations would be 10% for all Asian suspects. If the allele frequency was less
than 5% in all subpopulations, then a 5% frequency would be used. In practical
terms, rather than calculating a random match probability for a given DNA pro-
file of perhaps one in three hundred million, using a ceiling approach the
probability might be more like one in three hundred thousand. The ceiling ap-
proach would be expected to result in a much larger number of expected individu-
als with DNA profiles matching that of the crime scene DNA sample. Although
such evidence would still have probative value, the random match frequency
would no longer be so small as to appear to the juror to function as a virtual
identification of the criminal perpetrator. For this reason, there has been a great
deal of resistance by prosecution expert witnesses to using a ceiling approach in
statistical calculations of DNA evidence.
78. For example, whether allele frequencies are similar or different when comparing
Hispanics of Argentinian, Cuban, Mexican, and Columbian origin. There are re-
ally two parts to this question. Do allele frequencies vary significantly in the
countries of origin of such individuals? If so, once such individuals have entered
the United States, does sufficient intermarriage occur between subpopulations to
eliminate the effects of initial differences in allele frequencies. For recent immi-
grants or visitors to the United States, the second question is irrelevant.
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to any significant extent, and any minor substructuring is more than
compensated for by "conservative" techniques used in calculating al-
lele and genotype frequencies. 79 Expert witnesses for the defense
have argued that there is insufficient data to know how large an effect
population substructuring might have, and it is therefore not possible
to say that the effect has been adequately compensated for by such
"conservative" techniques.8 0
In addressing the admissibility of DNA evidence in Frye jurisdic-
tions, defense counsel should argue that there is sufficient disagree-
ment within the scientific community to exclude statistical
calculations based upon the product rule. Support for this position
comes from recent appellate level decisions,s1 the NRC report,8 2 and
79. United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 182 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff'd, 12 F.3d 540
(6th Cir. 1993); State v. Anderson, 881 P.2d 29, 37-38 (N.M. 1994); Springfield v.
State, 860 P.2d 435, 447 (Wyo. 1993).
80. See United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 182-84 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff'd, 12 F.3d
540 (6th Cir. 1993); State v. Anderson, 881 P.2d 29, 38-40 (N.M. 1994).
It has been pointed out in a number of review articles that the existence of
population substructuring may not be relevant in calculating allele and genotype
frequencies. E.g., Richard Lempert, The Suspect Population and DNA Identifica-
tion, 34 JunuErucs J. 1 (1993). Consider, for example, the case where a suspect
of Finnish ancestry has been DNA typed. Should the probability of a randomly
matching DNA profile be calculated specifically for Americans of Finnish ances-
try? This might be appropriate if there is reason to believe that the population of
all possible suspects consisted largely of Finnish-Americans. If an assault oc-
curred in a town where most of the residents were Finnish-Americans, then a
subpopulation database would be justified. However, in most crimes there is no
reason to believe that the potential suspect population is limited to the ethnicity
of any individual suspect. A crime occurring in Houston or Baltimore could have
been committed by any one of millions of potential suspects. The fact that the
police have arrested, for example, an Ethiopian-American suspect does not indi-
cate that only Ethiopian-Americans could have committed the crime. This argu-
ment can be carried even further. Consider a case where a murder has been
committed and there are no witnesses to the crime. From circumstantial evi-
dence, a Caucasian suspect is arrested. There is no reason to rule out Blacks,
Hispanics or Asians as potential suspects, but forensic laboratories would rou-
tinely calculate the statistical significance of DNA evidence using a Caucasian
database. In some cases, it might be most appropriate to use a database contain-
ing allele frequencies for the entire American population, ignoring all ethnic
distinctions.
81. See State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1187-90 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1578 (1994); People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 724-26 (Ct. App. 1993); Peo-
ple v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 743-45 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Sivri, 646
A.2d 169, 190-92 (Conn. 1994); United States v. Porter, 618 A-2d 629, 631 (D.C.
1992); Vargas v. State, 640 So. 2d 1139, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); People v.
Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 644-48 (M. App. Ct. 1994); Commonwealth v. Lanigan,
596 N.E.2d 311, 314-17 (Mass. 1992); Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440,
442-45 (Mass. 1991); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 494 (N.H. 1992); State
v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 512-17 (Wash. 1993).
82. See NRC REPoRT, supra note 2, at 76-85.
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other scientific publications.S8 It should be emphasized that vehe-
ment disagreement over the validity of these statistical calculations
continues within the scientific community.8 4 Courts in a number of
jurisdictions have held that DNA evidence is meaningless in the ab-
sence of the statistical calculations.85 This position is also supported
by the NRC report.8 6 Therefore, if the statistical analysis is ruled
inadmissible under Frye, the defense should argue that evidence of a
matching DNA profile between the suspect and a crime scene sample
is also inadmissible.87
As noted in some recent appellate decisions, if prosecution expert
witnesses were willing to adopt a reasonable compromise, such as the
ceiling principle, in the statistical calculations of the significance of a
DNA match, then there would likely be a consensus within the scien-
tific community that such conservative calculations were reliable and
valid.88 In that case, DNA evidence would be admissible even under
the Frye standard. So far, the prosecution has been generally unwill-
ing to change their estimates of the random match probability as
83. See Daniel L. Hartl & Richard C. Lewontin, DNA Fingerprinting, 266 ScIENcE
201 (1994); Krane et al., supra note 29, at 10583; Lewontin & Hartl, supra note
29, at 1745.
84. See Aldhous, supra note 33, at 755; Hartl & Lewontin, supra note 83, at 201;
Lander, supra note 33, at 1221. But see Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA
Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest, 371 NATuPE 735 (1994).
85. See People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 726 n.3 (Ct. App. 1993); People v.
Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 742 (Ct. App. 1992); Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d
884, 893 n.18 (Colo. 1993); State v. Sivri, 646 A.2d 169, 190 (Conn. 1994); Nelson
v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 76 (Del. 1993); United States v. Porter, 618 A-2d 631, 640
(D.C. 1992); People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 644 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Common-
wealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Mass. 1992); Commonwealth v. Cumin,
565 N.E.2d 440, 443-44 n.7 (Mass. 1991); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483,
494 (N.H. 1992); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 516 (Wash. 1993); Springfield
v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 448 (Wyo. 1993). But see State v. Bauer, 512 N.W.2d 112,
114, 116 (Minn. Ct. App.), aff'd, 516 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Crews, 640 A.2d 395, 402 (Pa. 1992).
86. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 74.
87. See People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 726 n.3 (Ct. App. 1993); People v.
Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 742 (Ct. App. 1992); Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d
884, 893 n.18 (Colo. 1993); State v. Sivri, 646 A.2d 169, 190 (Conn. 1994); Nelson
v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 76 (Del. 1993); United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 640
(D.C. 1992); People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 644 (1. App. Ct. 1994); Common-
wealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Mass. 1992); Commonwealth v. Cumin,
565 N.E.2d 440, 442-43 n.7 (Mass. 1991); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 494
(N.H. 1992); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 516 (Wash. 1993); Springfield v.
State, 860 P.2d 435, 448 (Wyo. 1993). But see State v. Bauer, 512 N.W.2d 112,
114, 116 (Minn. Ct. App.), aff'd, 516 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Crews, 640 A.2d 395, 402 (Pa. 1992).
88. See People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725-26 (Ct. App 1993); Vargas v.
State, 640 So. 2d 1139, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); People v. Watson, 629
N.E.2d 634, 647-48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); State v. Alt 504 N.W.2d 38, 50-51 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 517 (Wash. 1993).
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much as would be required by the ceiling principle.89 Prosecutors are
likely concerned that using the less inculpatory numbers generated by
a ceiling approach might introduce an element of reasonable doubt in
jurors' perceptions of the significance of DNA evidence.
VII. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH DNA ANALYSIS
A. False Negatives and False Positives
Following DNA analysis, the forensic laboratory will report one of
three results. The crime scene sample matches the suspect's DNA, the
crime scene sample does not match the suspect's DNA, or the results
are inconclusive. Inconclusive results can have several causes. There
may not have been enough DNA in the crime scene sample to allow a
comparison. The crime scene DNA may have been degraded by time
or bacterial digestion. The crime scene sample may have contained a
mixture of DNAs from a number of individuals, making it difficult to
interpret. For evidentiary purposes, inconclusive results have no sig-
nificance. They neither implicate nor rule out the suspect. In crimi-
nal trials where DNA evidence is a significant factor, the result will
either be that the sample matches the suspect's DNA or that it does
not match.
Most commentators agree that when the crime scene sample does
not match the suspect's DNA, this conclusively rules out that suspect
as having been the source of the crime scene sample. 90 For example,
in a rape case where it is known that a single perpetrator committed
the crime, if the DNA profiles of a semen sample and a suspect do not
match, it is safe to conclude that the suspect did not commit that
crime. Occasionally, juries have ignored exculpatory DNA evidence in
cases where other evidence connected the suspect with the crime.91
The main question for criminal defense attorneys is what to do
when the crime scene sample matches the suspect's DNA. It is impor-
tant to realize that all forms of scientific analysis are subject to error,
particularly when proper procedures are not followed. There are two
basic types of errors that can occur in DNA typing. These are false
negatives and false positives. The false negative error occurs when
the crime scene sample actually came from the suspect, but the DNA
analysis shows that it does not match the suspect's DNA profile. False
negatives, of course, favor the criminal defendant. If there is other
strong evidence linking the suspect to the crime, it is likely that the
89. See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725-26 (Ct. App. 1993).
90. See State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1185 n.20 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1578 (1994); State v. Sivri, 646 A.2d 169, 189 n.33 (Conn. 1994); State v. Ham-
mond, 604 A.2d 793, 801 n.8 (Conn. 1992); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 512
(Wash. 1993). See also NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 75.
91. State v. Hammond, 604 A.2d 793, 794, 800 (Conn. 1992).
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analysis will be repeated and any errors corrected. The problem for
the defendant occurs when there is a "false positive." In that case,
someone other than the suspect left the crime scene sample, but the
DNA analysis shows a match with the suspect's DNA. Because the
majority of criminal defendants cannot afford independent DNA test-
ing, it is unlikely that a false positive result will be detected by retest-
ing the samples.
B. Human Error
It has been incorrectly said that it is impossible to obtain a "false
positive" result using RFLP analysis.92 In fact, it is relatively easy.
During validation testing performed by the CACLD (California Associ-
ation of Crime Laboratory Directors), for example, Cellmark produced
a false positive result in one out of forty-four samples tested.93 It has
been alleged that such errors have occurred in DNA analysis per-
formed in actual casework.9 4 Although there have been few published
studies of the actual error rate in forensic DNA testing, the results are
not inconsistent with an error rate as high as one percent (one in one
hundred samples).95
While one percent might seem like a low rate of error, it is signifi-
cant in forensic applications. The probative value of DNA evidence is
related in large part to the low probability that someone other than
the suspect could have left a matching DNA sample. For example,
consider the case where the probability of finding a matching profile in
the general population is one in ten million. If this number is correct,
the jury can reasonably conclude that the DNA at the crime scene
came from the suspect. However, with a one percent false positive
92. See United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 175 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff'd, 12 F.3d 540
(6th Cir. 1993); Jonathan J. Koeher, Error and Exageration in the Presentation
of DNA Evidence at Trial, 34 Jtumvmmics J. 1, 23 nn.4-9 (1993).
93. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989). See also NRC REPORT,
supra note 2, at 88.
94. See NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 88.
95. The known or potential rate of error of the scientific technique is one of the fac-
tors suggested for consideration under Daubert. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993). Estimates of error rates in
forensic DNA testing have varied widely, from as low as 9 in one million (0.001%)
to as high as 4%. State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1180 n.16 (Ariz. 1993), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 1578 (1994); State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 53 n.26 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993). The NRC report recommends blind proficiency testing of forensic DNA
laboratories to establish a more accurate basis for error rate determination. NRC
REPoRT, supra note 2, at 88-89. In a blind test, the laboratory personnel are not
aware that they are processing samples for proficiency testing. In open profi-
ciency testing the laboratory personnel are aware that they are being tested and
arguably are more careful in processing those samples. The error rate with blind
testing is therefore more likely to resemble the error rate for actual case samples.
No forensic DNA laboratory in the United States is currently subject to blind
proficiency testing.
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rate, the chance that the observed match between the suspect's DNA
and the crime scene sample is due to a mistake in sample handling is
one in one hundred. To put it another way, in this scenario it is one
hundred thousand times more likely that an apparent match could
occur due to a mistake in sample handling than that it could occur in a
randomly chosen individual in the suspect population.
When the false positive error rate is so much higher than the
probability of a random match, the probative value of DNA evidence is
questionable. Under these circumstances, even when the probability
of a randomly matching DNA profile is extremely low, it is arguable
whether the jury can conclude that the suspect was at the crime scene
based upon DNA evidence alone.
Most sources of false positive results are attributable to human er-
ror. This can occur at many steps during both the collection of evi-
dence and the DNA analysis itself. The technician collecting samples
at the crime scene can mislabel them. In that case, a sample that is
known to have come from the victim might be labelled as having come
from the perpetrator, or vice versa. At each point in the chain of cus-
tody where samples are handled, they can potentially become mixed
up. At the forensic laboratory, the individual extracting DNA from
the suspect, victim, and crime scene sample, can mislabel or otherwise
mix up the tubes containing DNA. This was apparently the source of
the false positive in the Cellmark test described above.96 In the end,
instead of comparing the suspect's DNA to the crime scene sample, the
technician is actually comparing the suspect's DNA to itself, or the
crime scene DNA to itself. This will inevitably result in an apparent
match in DNA profiles.
Unfortunately, without independent sample testing it is extremely
difficult to detect a "false positive" caused by sample mishandling. Er-
rors in sample handling can sometimes be detected if the correct con-
trols are performed. For example, where the victim and perpetrator
are of different sexes, the careful forensic laboratory will screen the
Southern blot with a probe that only binds to DNA from males and not
females.9 7 In a heterosexual rape case, this sex specific probe should
bind to the suspect's DNA and to the DNA extracted from a semen
sample, but not to the victim's DNA. Inconsistent results can then be
attributed to sample handling error.
C. Band Shifting
Figure 2 illustrates a phenomenon known as "band shifting" that
can complicate RFLP analysis and potentially produce false positive
(or false negative) results. Band shifting is not well understood. It
96. State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 511 (Wash. 1993).
97. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 994-95 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
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can sometimes be caused by differences in the amount of DNA loaded,
particularly when ethidium bromide is used in the gel.98 Before the
restriction endonuclease digestion, the technician would normally
measure the concentration of DNA in each sample, and then digest
equal amounts to be run in each lane.99 Inaccuracy in the measure-
ment can result in one lane being overloaded with DNA. This lane
will run differently than adjacent lanes loaded with a "normal"
amount of DNA.
FIGURE 2. BAND SHIFTING
1 2
Two samples of DNA from the same individual run on the same gel may not move
exactly the same distance down the gel. Due to problems with sample contamination
or differences in the amount of DNA loaded in each lane, the alleles (bands) may be
slightly shifted in one lane. The problem for the forensic scientist is to determine
whether the type of pattern shown above is due to "band shifting" of two DNA
samples from the same individual, or represents DNA samples from two different
individuals.
The problem comes in interpreting a result as depicted in Figure 2.
Ordinarily, the correct procedure would be to run the analysis all over
again, using the same amount of DNA from each sample. When the
crime scene DNA sample is small to start with (a single drop of blood,
for example), it may not be possible to run the analysis again. The
technician must then decide how to interpret the results of Figure 2.
The first question is whether or not a match can be declared. This
depends in part upon how much difference in the apparent size of the
bands is present. In RFLP analysis, two samples of DNA taken from
the same individual, digested with restriction endonuclease and run
in two adjacent lanes, will not necessarily migrate exactly the same.
98. United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 179 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff'd, 12 F.3d 540
(6th Cir. 1993); People v. Mehlberg, 618 N.E.2d 1168, 1179, 1183 (Ill. App. Ct.),
cert. denied, 624 N.E.2d 813 (M11. 993).
99. DNA concentration can be measured by determining the amount of UV light of
280 nanometer wavelength that is absorbed by a sample. The more UV light is
absorbed by the sample, the greater the concentration of DNA in the sample.
This measurement is inherently inaccurate because UV light absorption can be
caused by other contaminants like proteins, ribonucleic acids and free nucleo-
tides. A more accurate technique is to add a fluorescent dye that binds to DNA
and to measure the amount of sample fluorescence. Results obtained with the
fluorescence technique can still be skewed by sample contamination.
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Therefore, when forensic laboratories run an RFLP analysis, they do
not require that two DNA samples migrate exactly the same distance
down the gel in order to declare a match.
Comparing lanes 1 and 2 in Figure 2, even though it is obvious that
the bands do not exactly coincide, if they fall within the forensic labo-
ratory's "match criterion" a match will be declared. The problem with
this is that there are two possible explanations for the discrepancy
between lanes 1 and 2. One explanation is that both DNA samples are
identical, but band shifting has caused them to migrate differently.
The other explanation is that the two DNA samples are not identical,
but the DNA fragments coincidentally migrate close to each other. In
order to separate these two possibilities when band shifting is sus-
pected, a control autoradiograph should be run using a monomorphic
probe to reprobe the same membrane.10 0
Monomorphic probes bind to genes that are highly conserved so
that they have the same apparent size in all human DNA samples.
When using a monomorphic probe and applying it to the same mem-
brane, if band shifting has occurred a result like Figure 3A should be
observed. If band shifting has not occurred we would expect to see the
pattern present in Figure 3B.
FIGURE 3. USE OF MONOMORPHIC PROBES TO DETECT
BAND SHIFTING
A B
1 2 1 2
When band shifting is suspected, the membrane should be stripped and reprobed
with a monomorphic probe. Monomorphic probes bind to DNA fragments that do not
vary between individuals. If band shifting has occurred, then a result like Fig. 3A
would be expected with a monomorphic probe. If no band shifting has occurred, a
result like Fig. 3B is expected.
It is questionable whether band shifting can be corrected by using
monomorphic probes.1O1 DNA fragments of different size located in
the same lane on the gel may be subject to different degrees of band
shifting.3102 Therefore, the degree of band shifting exhibited by the
100. See Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 442 (Ga. 1990); State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d
38, 47 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 60.
101. NRC REPoRT, supra note 2, at 60-61.
102. Id. at 61.
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monomorphic probe may be different from the degree of band shifting
for the alleles seen on the autoradiograph. If enough band shifting
has occurred that the alleles do not fall within the match criterion, the
results should probably be labeled as either inconclusive or not
matching.
D. Quality of the DNA Sample
Quality of the sample is of greater concern with the PCR technique
of DNA analysis than with the RFLP technique. The major concerns
are with degradation of the crime scene sample and possible contami-
nation with other sources of DNA.
Degradation of DNA can occur spontaneously over time. The rate
of degradation would be expected to increase with prolonged exposure
to sunlight, elevated temperature, or digestion by microorganisms.
Typically, degradation would not be a serious problem in generating
false positive results. As degradation proceeds, the DNA molecules
become progressively shorter in length. The only way in which a false
positive could occur would be if a larger allele in a crime scene sample
coincidentally became as short as a smaller allele in a suspect's DNA.
This is very unlikely, particularly for a four or five locus RFLP analy-
sis. Degradation of DNA is easily detectable by using a monomorphic
probe that binds to a large DNA fragment. Such fragments should be
lost or shortened if DNA degradation has occurred.
Due to the sensitivity of the PCR analysis, contamination of a
crime scene sample with other sources of DNA is a very serious prob-
lem when using this technique. In PCR analysis, contamination of a
crime scene sample could occur by simply flipping open the cap on an-
other tube of DNA or by using the same pipet to handle multiple DNA
samples 3- Contamination would be expected to result in the pres-
ence of too many bands on the gel analyzing the PCR product. If that
is the case, the results should be discarded and the analysis run again.
If the crime scene sample is itself contaminated, further analysis may
not be possible.
Because the RFLP technique does not involve amplification of
DNA, it is much less sensitive to contamination. Things like pipettor
carry over or aerosol formation by flipping open tubes should not cause
detectable artifacts on RFLP analysis. Only major amounts of sample
contamination should be detectable by RFLP. This might occur if
DNA from more than one source is present in the crime scene sample.
For example, the DNA profile from a multiple rape case or a mixed
blood sample could be difficult to interpret.10 4 Again, it would be ex-
103. Id. at 66.
104. Id.
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pected that if contamination is a problem, it would result in inconclu-
sive results rather than a false positive result.
Another potential source of contamination is from bacterial DNA.
Since crime scene samples are not sterile, it is always possible to have
some bacterial DNA present. This would most likely show up as "ex-
tra" bands on an autoradiograph. A possible result from such contam-
ination is illustrated in Figure 4. Comparing lanes 1 and 2 in Figure
4, it can be seen that the bands match except for an additional band in
lane 2. Such artifacts have been reported in actual casework.105 It
should never be assumed that "extra" DNA bands are due to bacterial
contamination. Rather, the Southern blot should be stripped and
reprobed with bacterial specific probes. If the "extra" band is bacterial
in origin, it should bind relatively strongly to a bacterial DNA probe.
Unless the extra band can be positively identified as bacterial in ori-
gin, the results of Figure 4 should either be declared inconclusive or a
nonmatch.106
FIGURE 4. CONTAMINATION WITH BACTERIAL DNA
MW 1 2
Probes specific for human DNA are not supposed to bind to bacterial DNA. However,
occasionally a crime scene sample that is bacterially contaminated will show extra
bands (lane 2). These may or may not be fainter than the human DNA alleles.
When "extra" bands are present, they should not be presumed to be due to bacterial
contamination. If the membrane shown above were stripped and reprobed with
bacterial DNA, it should show a very heavy band where the faint band in lane 2 is
located. This would positively identify the "extra" band in lane 2 as bacterial DNA.
The lane marked "MW" represents molecular weight DNA standards.
105. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 996-97 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
106. See People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 723 (Ct. App. 1993); People v. Castro,
545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
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VIII. HOW TO CHALLENGE THE WEIGHT OF DNA EVIDENCE
A. False Positives and Laboratory Error Rates
As previously discussed, the easiest way to generate a false posi-
tive is by mislabelling or otherwise mixing up the samples.107 If there
is any evidence that the state has been sloppy in their handling or
labelling of samples, or if there are gaps in the chain of custody, this
may be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the probity of a
reported match. In any case, it might be possible to raise such doubts
by cross-examination about false positives and laboratory error rates.
A possible line of questioning is suggested:
Q. Dr. Smith, are you familiar with what a "false positive" is?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you explain to the jury what a false positive in DNA typing
work would be?
A. A false positive would occur if an apparent match between the sus-
pect's DNA and a crime scene sample was due to some mistake in the
process of DNA typing.
Q. So it is not the same thing as a random match, where the suspect's
DNA profile coincidentally matches that of the criminal perpetrator?
A. No. With a false positive, there really is no match between the sus-
pect's DNA profile and the crime scene sample, just an appearance of
one.
Q. Could a false positive occur, for example, if the laboratory techni-
cian processing the DNA samples accidentally mixed up or mislabelled
the samples?
A. In theory yes. However, there is no evidence that this could have
occurred in the present case.
Q. Have you ever heard of a false positive occurring in forensic DNA
analysis?
A. (This will either be yes or no. The CACLD study has been widely
reported.108 However, it may be necessary to introduce evidence of
the CACLD results.) Yes, an external proficiency test of forensic DNA
laboratories was conducted in 1987 and 1988 by the California Associ-
ation of Crime Laboratory Directors. Results were reported from the
FBI laboratory, Lifecodes and Cellmark. Some false positives were re-
ported in that study.
Q. In fact, out of the 300 samples tested in the CACLD study, there
were two false positives and one other error, is that correct?09
A. Yes.
Q. So the apparent error rate detected in that study was 3 errors out
of 300 samples tested, or one percent?
107. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 93.
109. See Koehler, supra note 92, at 25.
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A. That is correct. However, following that study, changes in labora-
tory protocols were made to prevent such errors from recurring.
Q. Are you saying that the people working in your laboratory are abso-
lutely incapable of making mistakes? That there is no possibility of
any errors occurring?
A. No, I am saying that we have tried to design procedures so that
there will be a minimum chance of errors occurring, and to catch any
errors if they do occur. Our internal proficiency testing indicates that
we have been successful at this.
Q. Could you describe to the jury how your proficiency testing works?
A. We provide samples of known DNA profile to our laboratory techni-
cians, under conditions similar to those that might be encountered in
the field. They are processed according to the standard protocol and
we see if they obtain the correct results. If the wrong results are ob-
tained, we go back and see where mistakes were made and redesign
our protocols to prevent them from recurring.
(At this point it might be appropriate to ask what error rate has been
detected by internal proficiency testing, but only if discovery has
shown that the error rate is significant. The discovery process will be
very important in identifying possible points of attacking forensic lab-
oratory procedure, like proficiency testing and error rates.)
Q. You say that your proficiency testing samples are designed to re-
semble crime scene samples. Does this mean that you spill some blood
on a sidewalk, allow it to be contaminated by bacteria and dirt, and let
it sit in the sun for a couple of hours before collecting it?
A. No, normally we place some blood on a clean piece of cloth, let it
dry, and allow the technician to process it from there.
Q. Would the things that actually happen to real crime scene samples,
the dirt, the bacterial contamination, the exposure to sunlight, or
other factors, make it easier or more difficult to get accurate results
with DNA typing?
A. They would make it more difficult.
Q. Then the samples you use for your proficiency testing are really
designed to make it easier to get a correct result?
A- We try to design samples so that if an incorrect result is obtained,
we know that it is due to operator error and not to some problem with
the sample itself.
Q. Is your proficiency testing blind or open?
A. We use open testing.
Q. So the technicians working on those samples are aware that they
are being tested?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it possible that people who know someone is looking over their
shoulder and watching their results will be more careful than people
who do not think that they are being tested?
A. It might be possible.
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Q. So the error rate you report in your open proficiency testing is prob-
ably lower than the true laboratory error rate on actual case samples?
A. We have no evidence of this happening. There has never been a
reported case where our results have been shown to be in error.
Q. How often does it happen that some other laboratory checks the
results you have obtained with an actual case sample?
A. Not very often.
Q. Are you familiar with a report published by the National Research
Council entitled "DNA Technology in Forensic Science"?
A. Yes, there is some debate in the scientific community as to the ob-
jectiveness of that report.
Q. But the NRC report was sponsored by the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States. Would you agree that this is the most
prestigious organization of scientists in this country?
A. Yes, but I still do not agree with all the recommendations of that
report.
Q. Is one of those recommendations that forensic DNA laboratories
should be subjected to blind proficiency testing so we could have an
accurate estimate of laboratory error rates?lO
A. Yes, that is one of the recommendations. But many forensic scien-
tists believe that we should not comply with all the recommendations
of that report.
Q. Do you think that it is important to have an accurate estimate of
how frequently mistakes occur in DNA typing?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you think that blind testing might give a more accurate esti-
mate of the error rate than open testing?
A. Maybe, but no organization in this country is set up to conduct
blind testing.
Q. That is true even though blind, external proficiency testing of foren-
sic DNA laboratories has been conducted in England for a number of
years?
A. Yes.
B. Check for Possible Band Shifting
Even without the assistance of a DNA expert, it is important for
the defense to examine the autoradiographs used in the case. As is
obvious from Figures 1 through 4, you really do not need a technical
background to see if the bands line up in the right lanes or if extra
bands are present. Be aware that when laboratories make copies of
autoradiographs, faint extra bands on the originals can be made to
disappear. Any inconsistencies in a reported match, such as misalign-
ment of bands or extra bands, should be challenged. In recent years,
110. See NRC RPonr, supra note 2, at 88.
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forensic laboratories have become much more careful in reporting
matches. However, the quality of results will vary with laboratory ex-
perience. Technical problems like band shifting should be obvious
from the autoradiographs.
C. Attack the Statistical Analysis
Another point of attack is the statistical analysis of the probability
of finding a matching DNA profile in a randomly chosen individual
from the suspect population. (Remember that the suspect population
will usually be assumed to be identical with the actual suspect's eth-
nic group.) The use of extremely low probability estimates is inher-
ently suspect. In early cases involving DNA evidence, random match
probability estimates as low as one in 234 billion were offered in evi-
dence.-11 Consider the following hypothetical questioning of the pros-
ecution's expert witness in the Martinez case.'
1 2
Q. According to the statistical analysis you used, you determined that
the frequency of the defendant's DNA profile in a randomly mixed
human population would be approximately one in 234 billion, is that
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. What is the total world population at present?
A. Approximately five billion people.
Q. Ignore the fact that you have already identified the defendant's
DNA proffle. Hypothetically, for a randomly chosen DNA profile with
an expected frequency of one in 234 billion, if you tested the entire
world's population, would you be likely to find a match for that profile
in a population of only five billion?
A. It would be unlikely, but possible.
Q. So you would not expect to find such a rare DNA profile in the total
world's population, but the defendant obviously possesses this profile?
How do you explain this?
A. The fact that a particular DNA proffle has an expected frequency of
one in 234 billion doesn't necessarily mean that you would have to test
234 billion people to find that profile. You could just as easily find it
in the first five billion people tested.
(This is a slippery slope for the prosecution, and points to a weakness
of statistical arguments.)
Q. What is the total number of distinct DNA samples that has been
tested by the FBI to date?
A. About 1500 samples. (Note, this is an arbitrarily chosen estimate
of the number of samples tested by the FBI prior to the Martinez trial.
111. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 549 So. 2d 694, 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
112. Id.
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The number is much larger now, but still significantly less than five
billion.)
Q. If you are correct that the defendant's DNA profile has an expected
frequency of one in 234 billion, how likely is it that you would find it in
the first 1500 individuals tested by the FBI?
A. It would be extremely unlikely to find this specific DNA profile in a
sample of only 1500 individuals. However, since most VNTR alleles
occur infrequently, we would expect that the majority of DNA profiles
identified would have a low probability of a random match.
Q. So even though you estimate that the defendant's DNA profile has
a frequency of one in 234 billion, if you were to test another 1500 indi-
viduals you might very well find an identical DNA profile.
A. It would be so unlikely as to be almost impossible.
Q. Would it be any less likely than finding this specific DNA profile in
the first 1500 samples tested?
A. Assuming a random distribution of VNTR alleles in the human pop-
ulation, the odds of finding a specific DNA proffle in the first 1500
samples tested would be exactly the same as the odds of finding the
same profile in the second 1500 samples tested.
Q. In other words, the fact that something is extremely unlikely to
occur doesn't mean that it can't happen.
A. That's correct.
Q. Can you say that it's absolutely impossible for you to go out, grab
the first person you see on the street, test their DNA, and find a pat-
tern matching the defendant's DNA?
A. The odds against that happening are 234 billion to one.
Q. Is it impossible?
A. No, it is not absolutely impossible. (If the prosecution's expert wit-
ness tries to argue that it would be impossible to find a matching DNA
profile, he/she would have to admit that it is no more impossible than
finding the defendant's DNA profile in the first place.)
The recent trend seems to be for more conservative calculations to
be used by prosecution witnesses. These will be harder to attack, but
a possible line is suggested:
Q. Dr. Smith, is it your expert opinion that forensic DNA profiling is
based upon standard scientific methods and procedures?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And the number that you gave us for the probability of finding a
random DNA profile matching the crime scene sample, I believe it was
1 in 250,000, that number was also generated according to traditional
scientific procedures?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you absolutely, one hundred percent sure that the actual
probability of a random match is not really I in 249,000 or perhaps 1
in 240,000?
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A. The number that I gave, 1 in 250,000, is an estimate of the true
probability of finding a random match. The actual number might be a
little higher or a little lower.
Q. In a traditional scientific study, if you were making an estimate of
allele frequencies in some species of frogs or field mice, would the
traditional approach be to report your estimate plus or minus some
number representing the likely error in the estimate?
A. Yes, in a field study of allele distributions it would be traditional to
report the number as a mean plus or minus the standard deviation or
standard error of the estimate.
Q. So instead of saying I in 250,000, you would report the estimate as
being 1 in 250,000 plus or minus say 50,000?
A. Yes.
Q. What that would mean is that you would think the true number is
most likely somewhere between I in 200,000 and 1 in 300,000, but you
do not really know for sure what the real probability is?
A. I cannot say for sure what the true probability is, but I would be
surprised if it deviated very much from 1 in 250,000.
Q. You just testified that in a traditional population study, most scien-
tists would report values for allele frequencies as some number plus or
minus the likely error in that number. When you gave the jury your
estimate of the random match probability for the suspect's DNA, you
did not include any estimate of the likely error in that number, did
you?
A. That information is not available at the present time. Studies of
allele frequencies in humans are complicated by the fact that different
laboratories use different restriction enzymes and different probes, so
you cannot always compare allele frequencies between one study and
another. Also, relatively few studies of VNTR frequencies in human
populations have been published so far. For forensic purposes, we do
not really need to have an exact number for the random match
probability. An approximate estimate is sufficient to tell us how likely
or unlikely it is that we could find a randomly matching profile.
Q. But you do not really know how large the error is in your estimate.
So the actual probability could perhaps be 1 in 200,000 or 1 in
100,000, or even 1 in 50,000?
A. I would find it very unlikely that the error is that large.
Q. Do you have any scientific data proving what the error is?
A. No, it is my expert opinion that the error is unlikely to be so large.
Q. Let us say that the actual number is 1 in 250,000. This crime oc-
curred in metropolitan Los Angeles. There are about three and a half
million people living in Los Angeles alone, not including surrounding
cities. So if your estimate is accurate, you would expect to find an-
other fourteen people with exactly the same DNA profile living in this
city. Based upon your DNA analysis, can you say for sure that the
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perpetrator of this crime is the defendant and not one of the other
people with the same DNA profile?
A. Based just upon the DNA evidence, we would have no way of distin-
guishing between individuals with matching DNA profiles.
(Note, if there is other strong evidence linking the defendant to the
crime then this is probably not a good line to take. In that case, even a
successful attack upon the DNA evidence is unlikely to do much good.)
The point to make is that statistically unlikely events (like finding
a randomly matching DNA profile) can occur. If the prosecution wit-
nesses insist on using the product rule for their calculation (instead of
the NRC's ceiling principal) this can also be challenged on weight as
well as on admissibility. Even under Daubert, one of the factors to
consider in determining the reliability of evidence is the presence of a
general consensus within the scientific community. A number of re-
cent appellate cases have held that statistical DNA evidence based
upon the product rule is inadmissible.113
IX. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Two recent cases illustrate current trends in the field of DNA evi-
dence. State vs. Vandebogart was heard by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire on two separate occasions.114 The case was initially re-
versed and remanded after a finding that calculations of the statistical
significance of a DNA match using the product rule were not generally
accepted in the scientific community.' 15 In the second appeal, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed that the interim ceiling
principle proposed in the NRC report has gained general acceptance in
the relevant scientific community.116 Although not explicitly stated,
the implication is that in future criminal trials in the State of New
Hampshire in which DNA evidence is introduced, the prosecution
must use the ceiling principle rather than the product rule to deter-
mine statistical significance.117
A completely opposite result was reached by the California Court
of Appeals, Second Appellate District. In People vs. Wilds,118 the
court held that DNA evidence using the product rule to calculate the
statistical significance of a DNA match was admissible under a Kelly-
113. See supra notes 25, 59, 60, 81 and accompanying text.
114. State v. Vandebogart, 652 A.2d 671 (N.H. 1994); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d
483 (N.H. 1992).
115. State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 493-94 (N.H. 1992).
116. State v. Vandebogart, 652 A.2d 671, 675 (N.H. 1994).
The interim ceiling principle is basically the same as the ceiling principle de-
scribed in note 77 supra, except that it sets a minimum allele frequency of 10%
instead of 5%. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 91-93.
117. State v. Vandebogart, 652 A.2d 671, 675-77 (N.H. 1994).
118. People v. Wilds, No. B051544, 1995 Cal. App. LEXIS 29 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 12,
1995).
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Frye standard.119 In 1992, the First Appellate District had held in
People vs. Barney120 that the use of product rule calculations in DNA
evidence was not generally accepted in the scientific community.121
After questioning the ruling of the Barney court, the Second Appellate
District concluded that any disagreement within the scientific commu-
nity concerning the product rule and population substructuring had
been overcome by subsequent publications.122
The Wilds court placed particular emphasis on a 1994 publication
in which Lander and Budowle criticized the NRC report for being
overly conservative and proclaimed that "the DNA fingerprinting wars
are over."12S The Wilds court also cited additional evidence produced
by Dr. Chakraborty and the FBI that supported the use of the product
rule.124 The substance of the ruling was that there was no need and
little justification for using the NRC's ceiling principle, since the prod-
uct rule was generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community.12 5
To summarize the current state of DNA evidence in the United
States, in a large number of jurisdictions DNA evidence using the
product rule has been admissible in the past and continues to be ad-
missible at present. These include essentially all of the jurisdictions
using a relevancy standard and a number of Frye jurisdictions. A cer-
tain number of Frye jurisdictions have held that DNA evidence using
the product rule is inadmissible. Some of these have held that DNA
evidence is admissible when the more conservative ceiling principle
proposed by the NRC is used. In others, it has not yet been decided
whether or not the ceiling principle is an acceptable alternative to the
product rule. These developments have been described above in
detail.
The split of judicial authority reflects a corresponding split in sci-
entific opinion on the issue of population substructure and its effect on
the accuracy of calculations of the statistical significance of matching
DNA profiles. It is unlikely that the issues will be resolved until suffi-
cient data has been collected to measure the actual amount of popula-
tion substructuring in the United States and to determine whether or
not there is a substantial effect on the statistical analysis of DNA
evidence.
119. Id. at *15--33.
120. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Ct. App. 1992).
121. Id. at 736.
122. People v. Wilds, No. B051544, 1995 Cal. App. LEXIS 29, at *3-*4, *22-*33 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1995).
123. Lander & Budowle, supra note 84, at 735-37.
124. People v. Wilds, No. B051544, 1995 Cal. App. LEXIS 29, at *29-*30 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 12, 1995).
125. See id. at *26-*33.
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K CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article was to prepare criminal defense attor-
neys to challenge forensic DNA evidence when there is no expert DNA
witness available to assist the defense. The scientific background of
forensic DNA analysis was described in the first Part of the Article.
This was followed by a summary of relevant case law concerning fo-
rensic DNA analysis in criminal proceedings in the United States. Fi-
nally, some practical suggestions were made to assist defense
attorneys in cross-examination of the prosecution's expert witnesses.
The suggestions of this Article should assist the criminal defense at-
torney in attacking the admissibility, as well as the weight, of DNA
evidence.
